RetroSimba

Blinded by impatience, insecurity and inability to quell internal politics, Cardinals owner Gussie Busch ousted the general manager who built the team that two months later would win the franchise’s first World Series title in 18 years.

On Aug. 17, 1964, Busch fired general manager Bing Devine.

“It was a travesty,” St. Louis journalist Bob Broeg wrote in recalling the firing 40 years later. “A lot of the players on the team felt the same way.”

Trades engineered by Devine brought to the Cardinals core players on the championship club. They included outfielders Lou Brock and Curt Flood, infielders Bill White, Julian Javier and Dick Groat and pitchers Curt Simmons, Roger Craig, Ron Taylor and Barney Schultz.

Under Devine’s leadership, the minor-league system also developed essential Cardinals such as pitchers Bob Gibson, Ray Sadecki and Ray Washburn as well as outfielder Mike Shannon and catcher Tim McCarver. In the pipeline were prospects such as pitchers Steve Carlton and Nelson Briles.

Busch became convinced in August 1964 the Cardinals needed to dump Devine (and replace manager Johnny Keane with Leo Durocher after the regular season) in order to produce a champion.

The Cardinals were 62-55, nine behind the first-place Phillies, in the National League when Busch fired Devine. From there, the Cardinals went 31-14, finishing in first place at 93-69, one game ahead of both the Reds and Phillies.

In his book “October 1964,” author David Halberstam wrote, “Devine went quietly. It was something he had always expected. He had been dealing for the last seven years from a position of limited strength and the pressure to produce a winner had grown every year. Life under as volatile a man as Gussie Busch was like living on a precipice, he thought.”

The three key reasons why Busch fired Devine:

Impatience

The Cardinals hadn’t won a pennant since Busch took control of the club in February 1953. Devine had been general manager since replacing Frank Lane in November 1957.

After the Cardinals placed second in 1963, Busch had high expectations for the following year. His frustration reached a boiling point in August 1964.

“I have been worried about the Cardinals for a long time,” Busch said to The Sporting News after firing Devine. “The club has not been making any progress.”

In his book “The Memoirs of Bing Devine,” Devine said, “There’s no question in my mind I got fired because Mr. Busch was frustrated. He’d always had success with Anheuser-Busch. He’d owned the Cardinals for 10 years and he was tired of not succeeding in this other business.”

Insecurity

A mid-season incident involving Groat hurt Devine’s relationship with Busch.

Keane had given Groat approval to call for the hit-and-run play when he saw an opportunity to execute it. Groat handled the bat well, but, in Keane’s view, Groat abused the privilege.

When Keane banned Groat from calling the hit-and-run, Groat groused openly and often. Devine learned of Groat’s unhappiness and told Keane to conduct a team meeting and confront Groat. Keane did and the matter was resolved when Groat apologized to Keane and the team and stopped his complaining.

Devine didn’t inform Busch of the incident because he viewed such squabbles as commonplace in clubhouses. Besides, the problem wasn’t lingering.

Braves third baseman Eddie Mathews, though, was friendly with Groat and heard of Groat’s initial unhappiness. Mathews was dating Busch’s daughter, Elizabeth, and told her of the conflict. She, in turn, told her father.

Busch was angry Devine hadn’t informed him. He became suspicious, wondering what else Devine wasn’t telling him.

“Busch was upset and that may have affected his thinking about me,” Devine said.

According to Halberstam, Busch “was more than a little paranoid anyway; it seemed to go with the territory with a man who had so much power in, but knew so little about, the high-profile business of baseball.”

Internal politics

Busch had hired Branch Rickey, the former longtime Cardinals general manager, as a consultant. Rickey, 82, and Devine clashed. Rickey meddled and criticized Devine in talks with Busch.

Rickey had built the Cardinals’ minor-league system in the 1920s and his influence was evident in remarks Busch made after Devine was fired.

“I am concerned that we cannot trade our way to a pennant,” Busch said to The Sporting News in August 1964. “We must depend on production out of our own system and I have been disappointed with the operation of our farm department. There just seems to be a gap someplace between the signing of players, their development and their progress to the Cardinals as men ready to do a major league job.”

Busch insisted Rickey didn’t trigger his decision to fire Devine. “Rickey had nothing to do with it,” he said. “I did not consult him until I’d made up my mind.”

Few bought that explanation. “He (Rickey) was undercutting Bing,” wrote Broeg. “We all knew that.”

Wrote Halberstam, “Rickey gradually increased the tempo of his drive against Devine … The veteran players, who liked Devine, and who did not think the team needed two general managers, were not amused. They knew that the more senior they were, the more likely Rickey was to get rid of them at the end of the season.”

In his book “Stranger to the Game,” Gibson said, “The players were hurt by Devine’s firing, but we decided that instead of packing it in for the year, we would dedicate ourselves to redeeming Devine with a strong finish.”

According to the book “The Spirit of St. Louis,” Busch asked broadcaster Harry Caray to become general manager. Caray declined and suggested Busch hire former St. Louis Browns owner Bill Veeck, but Veeck demanded a controlling interest of the stock in the Cardinals.

On Rickey’s suggestion, Bob Howsam, who had joined Rickey in a failed bid to start a third major league, the Continental League, was named general manager.

“Howsam did nothing to win the pennant after he became GM,” Broeg wrote. “He led the league in cheers.”

After the Cardinals won the World Series title, beating the Yankees in four of seven games, Keane resigned, rather than accept a contract extension, in protest of Devine’s dismissal. Keane accepted an offer to manage the Yankees.

Humiliated, Busch ordered Howsam to fire Rickey, and he did so.

Devine joined the Mets front office.

Howsam lasted with the Cardinals for two years, then went to the Reds. Stan Musial replaced him.

When Musial resigned in triumph after the Cardinals won the 1967 World Series title, Devine was rehired by Busch to be the Cardinals general manager.

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(Updated May 2, 2023)

After managing the Cardinals, Whitey Herzog decided to extend his baseball career as an executive with the Angels.

Herzog joined the Angels one year after his last season as Cardinals manager. He led the Cardinals to three National League pennants and one World Series title, quitting in midseason with the team mired in last place in July 1990.

Job confusion

In September 1991, Herzog was named senior vice president and director of player personnel of the Angels.

Herzog said he believed he was overseeing the entire Angels baseball operation.

Instead, he found himself in a power struggle.

Dan O’Brien was the Angels’ senior vice president for baseball operations when Herzog was hired.

Herzog thought O’Brien primarily would be his assistant, handling paperwork.

In his book “You’re Missin’ a Great Game,” Herzog said, “I made sure I worked out every detail in advance … I’d be in complete charge of baseball operations: the minor-league system, the hiring and firing of coaches and scouts, the ballclub’s trades and drafts.”

O’Brien thought Herzog primarily would be evaluating players, leaving O’Brien to direct most of the baseball operations, including approval of trades and free-agent signings.

Herzog won the battle _ O’Brien eventually was fired _ but lost the war, resigning before the Angels could become contenders.

Work from home

His friends, Angels owners Gene and Jackie Autry, hired Herzog with the goal of bringing the franchise its first American League pennant and World Series title.

Herzog was given an apartment in Anaheim, but kept his residence in the St. Louis area and did most of his work from that home. He didn’t have an office at the Angels ballpark.

“Whitey doesn’t want to be an office person and he doesn’t have to be,” Angels president Richard Brown told the Los Angeles Times. “My exact words to him were, ‘If I see you in Anaheim in the office, you’re not doing your job.’ He has to be on the road a lot. I’m going to be relying on him constantly to evaluate our young players, and I don’t want him reading scouting reports. I want him evaluating what he saw.”

O’Brien did have an office at the Angels ballpark.

In a March 1992 interview, six months after Herzog was hired, O’Brien told the Los Angeles Times, “You can’t do things in this business in 1992 as you did in 1990 because it’s in a constant state of change. Contracts, more than anything else, keep getting in the way. The talent is probably now one of the easier things to analyze.”

In 1992, Herzog’s first full season with the team, the Angels finished 72-90 and ranked last in the American League in hitting and runs scored.

The next year wasn’t much better. The 1993 Angels finished 71-91. Herzog and O’Brien remained at odds. Bob Nightengale of the Los Angeles Times described the working relationship of the two senior vice presidents as “deteriorated beyond repair.”

O’Brien ouster

In mid-September 1993, Brown convinced the Autrys to fire O’Brien. Bill Bavasi, the Angels’ farm director, was promoted to general manager, reporting to Herzog. Bavasi was to handle administrative duties. Herzog was given the title of vice president in charge of baseball operations and was allowed to continue to work primarily from his suburban St. Louis home.

Wrote Nightengale, “The Herzog-O’Brien conflict was set in motion by the Angels two years ago when they appointed Herzog as vice president in charge of player personnel. Herzog was told that he would be in charge of all baseball operations, but O’Brien carried the title of vice president in charge of baseball operations and never relented in his duties, creating the impression within baseball that no one was in charge.”

Said Angels manager Buck Rodgers: “It was doomed from Day 1 … They are two good baseball men, but it’s hard to succeed when you don’t have one guy in control. You have to have a No. 1 guy.”

(A year later, in a November 1994 interview with Nightengale, O’Brien said he was surprised by his firing. “The thing that I find funny is that people kept saying that Whitey and I never got along,” O’Brien said. “That wasn’t true. I mean, Whitey was never around. He did things his way and I did things my way. All I know is that I was there every day in the office.”)

In his book, Herzog said, “They never told (O’Brien) what my duties were until I’d arrived. He got protective of his job, cut me out of meetings and fought my authority for two years.”

Old-school dropout

With O’Brien gone, Herzog gave an ill-advised multi-year contract to pitcher Joe Magrane, the former Cardinal. (Magrane would have elbow surgery 12 days before spring training began.) Herzog also created a stir by exploring the possibility of acquiring another former Cardinal, outfielder Vince Coleman, who had flopped with the Mets. (It didn’t happen.)

Herzog’s old-school tactics backfired with some players or their agents. He also may have felt restricted by a reduced player payroll. In January 1994, four months after O’Brien was fired, Herzog resigned, stunning the Angels. Bavasi replaced him.

In a blistering column, Mike Penner of the Los Angeles Times opined, “Herzog was baseball’s first absentee general manager _ he ran a ballclub based in Anaheim from his den in St. Louis _ and the best thing he generally managed from there was his leisure time.”

Said Herzog: “I don’t really want to be traveling all over and going back and forth to California or anywhere else.”

Wrote Nightengale, “Herzog was told that the Angels’ budget would have to be slashed to about $19 million, and instead of acquiring players in the free-agent market, he couldn’t even secure his own. He alienated several of his players in negotiations with his brash, sometimes abusive, style. He screamed at starter Mark Langston in a closed-door session. He slammed the phone in reliever Steve Frey’s ear. He bullied agents.”

“He had a great deal of respect and recognition among his peers, but the reality now is that this is a different era, and he hasn’t crossed that bridge,” said Steve Comte, Frey’s agent.

Said Arn Tellem, Langston’s agent: “Whitey’s strengths were finding and evaluating players, but not in the art of diplomacy dealing with lawyers and agents.”

In his book, Herzog took credit for identifying Angels minor leaguers Garret Anderson, Tim Salmon, Jim Edmonds and Gary DiSarcina as prospects and for preparing them to advance to the majors.

Said Herzog, “When I finally handed the reins over to Billy Bavasi in ’94 _ I’d been grooming him to replace me _ he said, ‘Man, you’re leaving at the wrong time. You’re the guy who put this together and it’s ready to blossom.’ I knew it was, but I didn’t need any credit.”

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Desperate for revenue and suspicious of new technology, the Cardinals joined the Browns in banning radio broadcasts of their games.

On Feb. 3, 1934, the National League Cardinals and American League Browns declared that radio broadcasts were having a negative impact on attendance at their games at Sportsman’s Park in St. Louis.

In 1933, with America reeling from the Great Depression, the Cardinals drew 256,171 in 77 home games, even though they had a winning record (82-71) and were just two years removed from a World Series championship. It was their lowest home attendance since moving to Sportsman’s Park from Robison Field in 1920.

The 1933 Browns, a last-place finisher at 55-96, attracted 88,113 in 77 home games.

Radio broadcasts of Cardinals and Browns games had been carried since 1926, five years after the first broadcast of a major-league game, the Phillies vs. the Pirates, on Pittsburgh station KDKA in 1921.

Under the headline “St. Louis Clubs Sign Off on Radio,” The Sporting News reported in its Feb. 8, 1934, edition that “this decision was reached with dramatic suddenness by Sam Breadon, president of the Cardinals, and Louis B. von Weise, who holds a similar title with the Browns.”

“There, no doubt, was a time when the microphones did us some good,” Breadon said. “That was in the high times. But now we are at a point where we are willing to experiment a season without the mikes.”

Strong reactions

St. Louis radio executives were stunned and disappointed.

“We feel that it was a service the public appreciated and that radiocasting of the games helps more than it damages attendance,” said Jack Van Valkenburg, president of KMOX.

Added Thomas Patrick Convey of St. Louis station KWK: “Nobody has worked harder than myself to try to get people out to the ballpark.”

In an editorial, The Sporting News supported the right of the St. Louis clubs to choose whether to permit radio broadcasts of games. “Like other sports, baseball long has been in doubt as to the value of broadcasts,” The Sporting News wrote. “… The opinion has been growing stronger within the past two years that, whatever good the radio may have done the game in the past, conditions now have changed and its tendency to cause the fan to sit in front of the loudspeaker instead of in the stands is beginning to outweigh all its advantages.”

Most of the mail Breadon received in reaction to the decision opposed the radio ban.

Business and marketing

Breadon, a native New Yorker, may have been influenced by the decisions of all three New York clubs _ the American League Yankees and the National League Dodgers and Giants _ to ban radio broadcasts of their games.

Teams in Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati and Detroit were continuing game broadcasts. Walgreens paid Chicago radio station WGN $45,000 to sponsor game broadcasts for the 1934 season, The Sporting News reported.

Radio magnate Powel Crosley had purchased the Reds, with the notion of using radio to promote his team and using the broadcasts as an advertising revenue generator for his stations.

Without the broadcasts, home attendance of the Cardinals and Browns increased in 1934. The Cardinals, who won the National League pennant and World Series championship that year, drew 325,056 in 77 home games, an increase of almost 70,000. The Browns, who placed sixth at 67-85 in 1934, attracted 115,305, a spike of 27,000.

In 1935, the broadcasts of Cardinals and Browns games were restored. The business models in Chicago and Cincinnati may have convinced the St. Louis clubs to end the ban.

Capitalizing on their status as reigning World Series champions, Cardinals home attendance jumped to 506,084 in 1935. The Browns, who fell back to seventh place in 1935, drew 80,922 to 76 home games that year, including 300 to a Friday afternoon game on May 10 against the Athletics. Boxscore

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